

NOTES



- 1 'In the field of experience man appears both as a specific *suppositum* and as a concrete "I", unique and unrepeatable in each case. It is "the experience of a man" in two senses at once, since he who experiences is a man and he who is experienced by the subject of the experience is also a man. Man is subject and object simultaneously. One of the essential characteristics of experience is its objectiveness, it is always experience of 'something' or of 'somebody'. Hence man as subject is also experienced in the same way as an object. Experience pushes out of man's cognition the conception of pure subjectivity (pure consciousness), but welcomes all that this conception has done to deepen our knowledge of man to the dimensions of objective reality' ('The Person: Subject and Community' in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24.1976, p. 2 and p. 7.) In 'Person and Act' the author analyses a number of facts bearing on the dynamic integrality of the concept 'a man acts', which preserves its real objectivity solely in the subjectivity of man. On the strength of these facts we can correctly set limits to the fear of falling into subjectivism.
- 2 The author has made a detailed analysis of the faculty of self-determination in his study 'Person and Act', Cracow 1969, Part II of which is called 'The Transcendence of the Person in the Act' (pp. 107-196).
- 3 The term 'object' in the phrase 'human person as the object of another human being's action' is used in the broad sense implicit in the objectivist philosophical perspective adopted by the author from the outset of his enquiry (cf Footnote I). This sense of the word must not be confused with the other, narrower sense in which the author will use it when he discusses the possibility of treating a human person as 'an object of use' (v.p. 25 seq.) To treat someone as an object of use is the same as treating him or her as a means to an end, as a thing, with no respect for the independent purposiveness which belongs to the person.
- 4 Thus, moral obligations are imposed on the person as subject of action not only by other persons by virtue of the intrinsic value called 'dignity', but also by non-personal beings by reason of

their specific value, and in particular by living creatures especially those capable of suffering. These beings, however, not only can but must be treated instrumentally (become objects of use and exploitation), whenever treating them so is the only way of affectively affirming a person or persons. Whereas to treat one person purely as an instrument 'for the good of' another or even of all other persons is impermissible. This fundamental difference permits us to adapt a definition of the basic ethical principle which is relatively narrow, seen in the context of man's general moral obligations, and to express it in the form of the 'personalistic norm', or in other words the demand for the affirmation of the person. Narrowing down the scope of the principle in this way is justified by the quite exceptional importance of the dignity of the person, a value not to be compared with anything in the world outside the world of persons.

- 5 The author has defined and developed the personalistic formulation of Catholic sexual morality in a separate article 'The Problem of Catholic Sexual Morality: Reflections and Postulates', in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 13.1965 (2), pp. 5-25.

- 6 (i) The author has dealt with the distinction between psychological and ethical analyses in several places.

His broadest treatment of the subject will be found in the article 'The Problem of Will in the Analysis of Ethical Acts', in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5.1955-7 (1) pp. III-35. Psychology and ethics have the same point of departure, which is in this case the human being's actual inner awareness of his responsibility as agent (cf. also 'Person Act', Chapter I, 'Consciousness and Agency', pp. 27-106). The way in which human awareness of responsibility for action is understood by modern psychology shows the importance of St Thomas's analyses in this area, and certain shortcomings in the analyses of Kant and Scheler. Psychology and ethics see awareness of responsibility as an important element in the experience of the will and see the will at the core of the experience of responsibility. But at this juncture the two disciplines diverge, though in the course of further analysis there are other points at which they coincide. Psychology aims at disclosing by the empirical inductive method the specific mechanism by which the will operates, and identifying the concrete motive forces which make for the realization of a chosen end. Ethical analysis on the other hand aims at fully explaining the sense of rightness by identifying and characterizing the chosen end - its moral value. The feeling of being right is here seen as the source of an ethical value or of that through which a man becomes morally good or evil, which

can be understood either in the broad sense (good or evil internally, as a human being), or in a precise personalistic sense (true in attitude and behaviour to the value represented by the person).

- (ii) Kant meant the words 'merely the means to an end' in this context to signify that the person, as possessor of its own nature (understood substantially), can without harming itself assume the role, or even inadvertently perform the role of 'means to an end', on condition that the end which is someone else's is a lawful one, and that whoever 'uses' another's physical or psychic forces in this way is ready to put that person's inalienable value before the end immediately in view should an axiological conflict of that kind arise. In later pages of this study the author omits the word 'merely' (from the phrase 'merely a means to an end') when he has in mind not the substantial but merely the personal subjectiveness of human beings. Thus on p. 27 he states that '[Kant . . . demands that the person should never be a means to an end, but always and exclusively an end . . .]'.
 - 7 The author discusses the correct interpretation of the rights of God the Creator with regard to the human person more particularly in his article 'On the Meaning of Betrothed Love – Contribution to a Discussion', in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 22.1974 (2), [v. especially pp. 166–72].
 - 8 Because it reveals the essential truth about man as a person, the attitude to truth in particular is in the author's opinion of the essence of freedom and the conscience which binds freedom: 'Freedom is an attribute of the human person, not in the form of absolute independence, but as self-dependence comprising dependence on the truth . . . which finds its most striking expression in conscience . . . The proper and entire function of conscience consists in making action dependent on truth' ('Person and Act', pp. 162–3).
 - 9 Common good is understood here in a radically personalistic way. 'What we are concerned with is the truly personalistic structure of human life in the community to which a human being belongs. Common good is the good of the community in that it creates in an axiological sense the conditions of communal being; action follows the course thus set for it.

It may be that the common good defines, in the axiological order, the community, association or society. We delimit each of these on the basis of the common good peculiar to it. In doing so, we take action (*operari*) together with existence (*esse*). Common good, however, touches above all on the sphere of existence 'in common with others'. Mere action 'together with others' does

not reveal the reality of 'common good' so fully although it must be present here too. Ch. 'Person and Act', pp. 308-9. Also 'The Person: Subject and Community', in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24. 1976 (2), p. 23.

- 10 The author has devoted the last section of his 'Person and Act' (pp. 285-326), and an article called 'The Person: Subject and Community' (*Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24. 1976 (2), pp. 5-28,) to the question, dealt with cursorily here, of the specific structure of an interpersonal community.
- 11 It is, of course, not enough just to *want* to affirm the other person for the consequent act (of goodwill) to become also an act of love. It is necessary in addition for the action undertaken with the intention of affirming another person to be objectively suited to the role which the agent's intention assigns to it. Whether it is or is not suitable is decided by the objective structure of the person affected by the action. Only success in understanding the other person and allowing when acting for that person's specific traits ensures that the act will be recognizable as a genuine act of love. An imperfect understanding of the structure of the object person must, in consequence become the source of (inadvertent and hence involuntary) action to the detriment of that person. The danger is all the greater in that utilization of the other takes place in the name of love. The agent is unaware of his delusion, and so immune from blame. None the less, the agent is responsible for an act of 'anti-love' . . . because he loves. Only constant awareness of the danger of disintegration of love in this way (emotionalization) can help us to avoid it. Cf. Introduction to the first edition (Lublin 1960), p. 6, where the author postulates the need for 'the introduction of love into love'.
- 12 Further to the relationships between consciousness and emotion see 'Person and Act', pp. 51-6 and 258-75.
- 13 Utilitarianism has undergone a complicated evolution since the days of its founders. J. Bentham and J. S. Mill are best known as the propounders of the 'calculus of goods' as the only proper method of determining the moral value of actions. Different utilitarians, however, give different answers to the question which goods ought to be maximized. Many of them do not share Bentham's hedonistic identification of the highest good (which constitutes the ethically determined end of human aims) with pleasure (*bonum delectabile*). Such people accept as the good a more broadly and objectively conceived usefulness (*bonum utile*). Nor is there nowadays any lack of people who regard themselves as utilitarians while understanding the good which is the highest goal in a personalistic way, and subordinating the calculus of goods to the good (the perfection, the happiness) of

the person, always regarded as ethically the proper end of action (*bonum honestum*). Similarly, particular utilitarians given different answers when asked whose good we should be considering when we apply the calculus of goods; some prefer the private advantage of the subject of the action (variously defined, according to the answer given to the first question), others the advantage of a chosen social group (perhaps even a future generation of humanity, for which people now living are requested to sacrifice their happiness or to be sacrificed themselves), whilst others still prefer the greatest good of the greatest number.

The critique which follows here applies equally to the hedonistic variant of utilitarianism and to all others, to the extent that they represent an instrumentalist and reductionist attitude to the human person (I mean the tendency to reduce the person as a value to the value of that person's function, or in other words to the value of its 'usefulness' not necessarily in a hedonistic sense). It is not, however, relevant to the 'personalistic' variety of utilitarianism mentioned above.

The calculus of goods (the basic idea of which is, incidentally, not unknown to the Thomist tradition – think of the complex of problems known as '*ordo bonorum et caritatis*') is all the more difficult to apply in practice when the highest good which is the measure of all particular goods is understood in any but a straightforwardly sensual way. There is, then, nothing surprising in the fact that hedonism was the first and so to speak the classical variant of utilitarianism.

The author gave an extended critical exposition of utilitarianism in his lectures in the Catholic University of Lublin in the Academic year 1956–57. Cf. 'Problems of the Norm and of Happiness' (Typescript, Institute of Ethics, CUL).

- 14 A fuller definition of the difference between subjectivism and subjectivity is given below, and in 'Person and Act', pp. 56–60. See also 'Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man'. In [*Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. VII, pp. 107–14 (in English)].
- 15 Justice, here, is used in what may be called the strict sense (for in the broad, biblical sense a 'just' man is the same as the 'man of good will'). Justice in the strict sense signifies satisfaction of someone's minimum entitlement to personal or material services. But since love is just only when it is not minimalistic the services which justice in this narrow sense demands can only be the basis and condition of a full interpersonal affirmation. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII 1–1955a 26, and St Thomas *Contra Gentiles* III, 130.
- 16 Cf. 'Person and Act' pp. 230–5.
- 17 The sexual urge – in the broad sense – is valuable to man not only